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Abstract 
 
This paper investigates whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects corporate 
bond financing. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that firms with controlling 
shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms. The results show that managerial 
entrenchment of controlling shareholders has an influential impact on corporate bond financing. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Concentrated ownership provides shareholders with incentives to monitor managers, and to exercise 
influence over decision-making within the firm. Such controlling shareholders tend to entrench managers 
against other corporate governance mechanisms to pursue their own interests, and enjoy private benefits of 
control. 
Managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders could have a significant effect on costs of bond 
financing. Controlling shareholders often have incentives to enjoy the private benefits of control that are 
detrimental to bondholders. Such conflicts of interest between controlling shareholders and bondholders 
result into potentially higher likelihood of default. If bondholders perceive expropriation by controlling 
shareholders as increasing the agency risk in the evaluation of potential default risk, bondholders charge 
firms with controlling shareholders a higher rate to cover costs arising from divergent interests (Bhojraj and 
Sengupta, 2003). Furthermore, credit rating agencies that evaluate potential default risk may also be 
concerned about expropriation by controlling shareholders, and assign lower bond ratings to firms with 
controlling shareholders, thereby resulting in higher cost of bond financing (Ashbaugh-Skaife et al.., 2006). 
As a consequence, agency costs (higher bond yields and lower bond ratings) adversely affect the bond 
issuance of firms with controlling shareholders. 
On the other hand, in a managerial approach to capital structure choice, entrenched managers face loss 
of control over management when firms experience hostile takeovers or go into bankruptcy. Hostile 
takeovers and bankruptcies reduce managerial entrenchment because they affect the likelihood of 
managerial replacement (e.g., Novaes, 2003). To defend against unwanted takeover attempts, entrenched 
managers increase debt, thereby reducing raiders’ takeover incentives (e.g., Berger et al.., 1997). In contrast, 
entrenched managers have an incentive to reduce debt to prevent bankruptcies. In choice of debt level, 
entrenched managers face a trade-off between lower debt levels that avoid bankruptcies and higher debt 
levels that deter hostile takeovers. However, if the threat of hostile takeover is absent, entrenched managers 
have an incentive to reduce debt to avoid bankruptcies. Consequently, in an environment in which the 
threat of hostile takeover is absent, managerial entrenchment provides controlling shareholders with less 
incentive to issue corporate bonds. 
In this paper, we examine whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders affects 
corporate bond financing. Given the discussion above, equity ownership by controlling shareholders could 
be negatively associated with levels of corporate bonds in an environment in which the threat of hostile 
takeover is absent－hostile takeover activities themselves are rare or higher equity ownership defend 
against hostile takeovers. 
Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that equity ownership by large corporate 
shareholders is negatively related to levels of straight corporate bonds after controlling for other 
determinants of straight corporate bonds. This indicates that firms with controlling shareholders issue less 
straight corporate bonds than other firms. As a consequence, managerial entrenchment of controlling 
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shareholders has an influential impact on corporate bond financing. 
 
2. Data 
 
Our data come from financial statement dataset compiled by the Japan Development Bank which includes 
the unconsolidated data of the non-financial firms traded on the stock exchange. We use data on 
manufacturing firms listed on the stock exchange from March 1994 to March 1999. As a result, our sample 
consists of 1049 firms.  
We focus on Japanese manufacturing firms because large corporate shareholders as controlling 
shareholders are prevalent. The relationship between owned firms and large corporate shareholders is often 
characterized as a vertical business linkage between subcontracting firms as suppliers and core firms as 
manufacturers. Large corporate shareholders as stable shareholders have long-term relationships with 
owned firms through repeat business transactions. Such large corporate shareholders have strong incentives 
to entrench managers to maintain long-term relationships with owned firms. Moreover, hostile takeovers 
rarely occurred in the 1990s in Japan.1 Although mergers and acquisitions (M＆A) increased in the late 
1990s, most of them were friendly takeovers. Therefore, data on Japanese manufacturing firms in the 1990s 
are suitable for testing our hypothesis.  
  To test our hypothesis, we estimate the following equation: 
Straight corporate bond ratio୲ 
=β଴ ൅ βଵLarge corporate shareholder ownership୲ିଵ ൅ βଶFinancial institution ownership୲ିଵ 
+βଷROA୲ିଵ ൅ βସLoan ratio୲ିଵ ൅ βହCash ratio୲ିଵ ൅ β଺Other corporate bond ratio୲ିଵ 
+β଻Sales growth୲ିଵ ൅ β଼Firm size୲ ൅ βଽFirm age୲ ൅ ε୲ 
where straight corporate bond ratio is the ratio of straight corporate bonds to total assets, large corporate 
shareholder ownership is equity ownership by corporate shareholders as top shareholder, financial 
institution ownership is equity ownership by financial institutions, ROA is the ratio of pre-tax income to 
total assets, loan ratio is the ratio of loans (short- and long-term loans) to total assets, cash ratio is the ratio 
of cash and deposits to total assets, other corporate bond ratio is the ratio of convertible and warrant bonds 
to total assets, sales growth is the growth rate of sales over the previous year, firm size is the logarithm of 
total assets, firm age is the logarithm of years elapsed since establishment, t is the time subscript, β଴ is a 
constant, and ε୲ is the error term.  
In the equation, our key variable is large corporate shareholder ownership.  We here use two variables: 
equity ownership of more than 10％ (large corporate shareholder ownership 10) and more than 20％ 
(large corporate shareholder ownership 20). Higher equity ownership could serve as effective way of 
averting hostile takeovers, and provide shareholders with incentives to entrench managers. We expect the 
coefficients on these variables to be negative. Data on equity ownership by large corporate shareholders 
come from Japan Company Handbook. Financial institution ownership is included to capture the strength 
                                                  
1 Xu (2006) documents that hostile takeover activities in Japan increased drastically from January 2000. 
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of the relation between financial institutions and firms.2 Return on assets (ROA) is intended to control for 
financial conditions. We include the variables for loans, cash and other corporate bonds to capture the 
effects of funds that could substitute for corporate straight bonds. Sales growth is included to capture the 
effect of bond demand. Firm size and firm age are included because they are proxies for the 
creditworthiness of the firm. Typically, larger and older firms could have easy access to the bond market.  
Descriptive statistics for variables are provided in Table 1. Note that we remove the extreme values to 
ensure robust results.3 
 
3. Results 
 
Table 2 provides tobit regression estimates for the determinants of straight corporate bonds. To avoid 
potential endogeneity problem, we use one period lagged values of the independent variables except for 
firm size and firm age. Because data on equity ownership by large corporate shareholders are not 
available for all firms for all years, the number of observations varies with specifications. All our 
specifications include industry dummy variables and year dummy variables. 
Column 1 contains the results for the specification without the variable for large corporate shareholder 
ownership. We find significantly higher levels of straight bonds in firms with higher equity ownership by 
financial institution, lower ROA, less other funds (loans, cash, and other corporate bonds), higher sales 
growth, and larger firms. 
Column 2 contains the results for the specification with large corporate shareholder ownership 10. 
Negative and significant coefficient on large corporate shareholder ownership 10 indicates that firms with 
controlling shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms because of higher agency costs 
and incentives to avoid bankruptcies. The results for other variables are similar to those in column 1 except 
for financial institution ownership. This may be driven by higher correlation between two ownership 
variables. Indeed, the correlation coefficient of the two is －0.59.4 Column 3 contains the results for the 
specification with large corporate shareholder ownership 20, which could serve as more effective way of 
averting hostile takeovers. The coefficient on large corporate shareholder ownership 20 remains 
significantly negative. Results for other variables do not change.5  
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines whether managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders has an essential impact 
                                                  
2 Kang and Liu (2007) document that bond issues of firms closely affiliated with banks are more likely to be 
underwritten by banks. 
3 Extreme observations are defined as those for which any one of the variables has a value more than four 
standard deviations away from the mean value. 
4 The negative correlation between them may suggest that financial institutions tend not to have shares of firms 
with large corporate shareholders (Barucci and Mattesini, 2008). 
5 In columns 2-3, we obtain similar results when financial institution ownership is not included. 
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on corporate bond financing. Using data on Japanese manufacturing firms, we find that equity ownership 
by large corporate shareholders is negatively associated with levels of straight corporate bonds after 
controlling for other determinants of straight corporate bonds. This indicates that firms with controlling 
shareholders issue less straight corporate bonds than other firms because of higher agency costs and 
incentives to avoid bankruptcies. As a consequence, managerial entrenchment of controlling shareholders 
has a substantial impact on corporate bond financing. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Standard deviation 
Straight corporate bond ratio 0.022 0.044 
Large corporate shareholder ownership 10 0.309 0.154 
Large corporate shareholder ownership 20 0.371 0.133 
Financial institution ownership 0.313 0.158 
ROA 0.023 0.045 
Loan ratio 0.191 0.181 
Cash ratio 0.100 0.077 
Other corporate bond ratio 0.035 0.062 
Sales growth －0.001 0.104 
Firm size 10.902 1.333 
Firm age 3.994 0.299 
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Table 2. Managerial entrenchment and corporate bond financing 
 Dependent variable: straight corporate bond ratio 
Independent variable     1     2     3 
Large corporate shareholder ownership 10୲ିଵ  －0.120*  
  (0.016)  
Large corporate shareholder ownership 20୲ିଵ   －0.108* 
   (0.016) 
Financial institution ownership୲ିଵ 0.090* －0.009 0.003 
 (0.019) (0.023) (0.023) 
ROA୲ିଵ －0.516* －0.517* －0.517* 
 (0.066) (0.066) (0.066) 
Loan ratio୲ିଵ －0.068* －0.077* －0.077* 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) 
Cash ratio୲ିଵ －0.095* －0.122* －0.120* 
 (0.033) (0.034) (0.034) 
Other corporate bond ratio୲ିଵ －0.128* －0.115* －0.116* 
 (0.035) (0.035) (0.035) 
Sales growth୲ିଵ 0.072* 0.074* 0.074* 
 (0.026) (0.026) (0.026) 
Firm size୲ 0.028* 0.031* 0.031* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Firm age୲ 0.010 0.012 0.012 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) 
No. of observations 4025 4010 4010 
Pseudo ܴଶ    0.563 0.611 0.606 
Log likelihood －251.125 －222.864 －225.925 
Notes 
The table reports tobit regression estimates for 1049 Japanese manufacturing firms listed the stock 
exchange from March 1994 to March 1999. All regressions include a constant, industry dummy variables 
and time dummy variables. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * denotes significance at the 1 % 
level. 
